RACF Survey

## BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL

Ideally, users (typically Started Tasks) who are permitted access to FACILITY class profiles BPX.DAEMON and BPX.SERVER should only run 'trusted' programs to ensure they do not execute a rogue program that could abuse the privileges these permissions grant. Programs are 'trusted' when they are either (a) in the z/OS Link Pack Area (LPA), (b) assigned the extended "program-controlled" attribute 'p' in the Unix file system, or (c) defined to RACF via PROGRAM class profiles. For the latter, RACF installations typically activate the PROGRAM class, define a catch-all PROGRAM profile such as **, and add to this profile the appropriate load libraries containing the sanctioned, vendor-provided programs needed by BPX.DAEMON and BPX.SERVER users. An exemption for specific users can be made by defining and permitting them access to the discrete FACILITY class profile BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL. Such users can load programs from any MVS library without their having to be defined to RACF. This does, however, place them at risk of loading a rogue program.

Do you have discrete FACILITY class profile BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL defined on any of your production z/OS RACF systems where the PROGRAM class is also active?

Responses	Count	Percent %
Yes, on all systems	4	19.0%
Yes, on some systems	3	14.3%
No	14	66.7%
Total	**21**	**100%**

- All
- Some
- None

Are any users permitted access to profile BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL?

| Responses	Count	Percent %
No	0	0%
Yes, via UACC of READ or greater	1	16.7%
Yes, via permissions	5	83.3%
Total	**6**	**100%**

- No
- UACC
- Permits

For those users permitted access to BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL, are there plans to define the programs and load libraries they need in PROGRAM profiles and then remove their access?

Responses	Count	Percent %
Yes, for all of the users permitted access	2	33.3%
Yes, but only for some of the users permitted access	0	16.7%
No	4	66.7%
Total	**6**	**100%**

- All
- Some
- No

What users are permitted READ or greater access to BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL?

Responses	Count	Percent %
All users via UACC	0	0%
ID(*)	1	16.7%
All or nearly all of the same users as are permitted access to BPX.DAEMON and/or BPX.SERVER	0	0%
z/OS Unix Address Space (e.g., OMVS or OMVSKERN)	0	0%
Communication Server Started Tasks (e.g., TCPIP)	0	0%
DB2 Subsystems	2	33.3%
Systems Programmers / Technical Support Staff	1	16.7%
Other (None named)	2	33.3%%
Responses	**6**	

Why are users permitted access to BPX.DAEMON.HFSCTL?

Responses	Count	Percent %
Do not know - inherited system with these permissions	3	50.0%
Was not aware of the purpose of this profile and that remediation to remove access is recommended	2	33.3%
Permissions were granted to facilitate conversion from another security software product	1	16.7%
Afraid to remove permissions and cause an outage if programs and load libraries are mistakenly not defined in PROGRAM profiles	0	0%
Other (did not specify)	1	16.7%
Responses	**6**	